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Abstract
This paper takes a look at the Talmudic rule aka the 1/N rule aka the uniform
investment strategy from the viewpoint of elementary microeconomics. Specifically,
we derive the cardinal utility function for a Talmud-obeying agent which happens to
have the Cobb–Douglas form. Further, we investigate individual supply and demand
due to rebalancing and compare them to market depth of an exchange. Finally, we
discuss how operating as a liquidity provider can benefit the Talmud-obeying agent
with every exchange transaction in terms of the identified utility function.
1 Deriving the cardinal utility function
The Talmudic rule1 requires one to store equal amount of goods and money with respect
to the market price of the goods at any given time. Let us assume that an agent has
initially bought a quantity q0 of goods at the price p0 and is left with m0 units of money.
Then we can derive the cardinal utility function u(m, q) of that agent measured in the
units of money. First, the initial configuration requires the budget 2m0 = 2p0q0, thus we
have u(m0, q0) = 2p0q0. Second, having km of money and kq of goods should be exactly
k times more preferable than having m of money and q of goods. Finally, notice that
the Talmud-obeying agent should always be ready to exchange |∆q| of goods for |∆m|
of money (and vice versa) as long as the exchange rate is equal to the ratio between the
resulting amounts of money and goods in their possession:
∆m
∆q
= −m+∆m
q +∆q
;
dm
dq
= lim
∆q→0
∆m
∆q
= −m
q
;
dm
m
+
dq
q
= 0;
lnm+ ln q = lnC;
mq = C.
The latter means that u(m, q) remains constant along hyperbolas mq = C. Thus we have
u(m, q) = f(mq) for some function f(t). As noticed earlier, u(km, kq) = ku(m, q), hence
1 “A person should always divide his money into three; he should bury one-third in the ground, and
invest one-third in business, and keep one-third in his possession” (Bava Metzia 42a).
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Figure 1: Indifference map.
0
m
q
u = 2m0
u = 4m0
u = 6m0
m = p0q
m0
2m0
3m0
q0 2q0 3q0
Figure 2: Supply and demand.
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f(t) =
√
tf(1) and u(m, q) = f(1)
√
mq. Taking into account u(p0q0, q0) = 2p0q0, we
conclude with f(1) = 2
√
p0 and u(m, q) = 2
√
p0mq. Note that the latter utility function
has the Cobb–Douglas form Amαq1−α with efficiency A = 2
√
p0 and elasticity α = 1/2.
The resulting indifference map is illustrated in Figure 1. See also Appendix A.
2 Supply and demand due to rebalancing
Note that the indifference curve mq = m0q0 is defined in terms of amounts m and q that
are in possession of our Talmud-obeying agent, so it cannot be used directly to find the
supply and demand curves. Instead, we should consider supplied qs and demanded qd
quantities due to rebalancing required by the Talmudic rule when the price changes.
Specifically, when the price goes up, our agent is to sell some qs = q0 − q of their q0
units of goods, resulting in q units left in their possession. Note that since q > 0, we have
qs < q0. Conversely, when the price goes down, the agent buys qd = q− q0 units of goods
in addition to their q0 units and is left with the total of q units. As the Talmudic rule
implies m = pq at any given price p, we can rewrite the indifference curve as pq2 = p0q
2
0
and use it in order to obtain the following supply and demand curves:
ps =
p0q
2
0
(q0 − qs)2 , pd =
p0q
2
0
(q0 + qd)2
.
These supply and demand curves are illustrated in Figure 2. Notice that due to limited
resources q0 and m0 in possession of our Talmud-obeying agent, the supply curve has an
asymptote q = q0, whereas the total area below the demand curve is equal to m0:∫
∞
0
p0q
2
0
(q0 + qd)2
dqd = p0q0.
Figure 2 might look familiar. Indeed, it resembles market depth that is provided by
exchanges, when the current price is equal to p0. Notice that near p = p0, our supply and
demand curves behave linearly with the same absolute slope. The similar behavior can
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be noticed about market depth at relatively stable conditions near the current price. The
latter observation about market depth has a rather curious consequence. Namely, we can
estimate the budget u0 = 2p0q0 that is needed for a Talmud-obeying agent in order to
provide as much liquidity near the current price as the whole exchange does:
dps
dqs
= −dpd
dqd
=
2p0
q0
at qs = qd = 0;
u0 = 2p0q0 ≈ 4p20 ·
∣∣∣∣∆q∆p
∣∣∣∣ .
3 Operating as a market maker
In the previous sections, we applied the Talmudic rule to infinitesimal changes in price.
However, situation is slightly different for any finite non-zero change in price. As discussed
in [1, Section 2], the Talmudic rule then implies that the geometric mean of the quantity
of goods and the amount of money in possession always increases:
u1
u0
=
u(p1q1, q1)
u(p0q0, q0)
=
√
m1q1√
m0q0
=
p0 + p1
2
√
p0p1
> 1. (1)
Let us denote the relative differences in utility and price, respectively, as follows:
%∆u = 2 · |u0 − u1|
u0 + u1
, %∆p = 2 · |p0 − p1|
p0 + p1
.
Then, we can use (1) to calculate the relative growth in utility %∆u after the transaction
that corresponds to a relative change in price %∆p, assuming p1 > p0:
u1
u0
=
2 +%∆u
2−%∆u,
p1
p0
=
2 +%∆p
2−%∆p ;
u1
u0
=
1
2
(√
p1
p0
+
√
p0
p1
)
;
%∆u =
16− 8√4− (%∆p)2
(%∆p)2
− 2;
%∆u =
(%∆p)2
8
+
(%∆p)4
64
+O
(
(%∆p)6
)
at %∆p = 0.
For example, %∆p = 2% results in %∆u ≈ 0.5%. With such a transaction once a day
on average and assuming negligible transaction fees, the annual interest rate in terms of
our Talmudic utility is about 1.84%. As one would expect, the market maker has to face
a trade-off between the frequency of transactions and the utility growth per transaction.
In turn, [1] suggests that to find the optimal values of %∆p may not be a trivial problem.
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Appendix A The weighted Talmudic rule
This section considers an arbitrarily weighted version of the Talmudic rule. Specifically,
let α, β ∈ (0, 1) and α + β = 1. Then the weighted Talmudic rule would require one to
store portion α of value in money and β in goods with respect to the market price.
Let u(m, q) be the corresponding cardinal utility function. If u0 = u(m0, q0), then we
have m0 = αu0 and p0q0 = βu0. Note u(km, kq) = ku(m, q). The rest is straightforward:
p =
β
α
· m
q
;
∆m
∆q
= −β
α
· m+∆m
q +∆q
;
dm
dq
= lim
∆q→0
∆m
∆q
= −β
α
· m
q
;
α · dm
m
+ β · dq
q
= 0;
α lnm+ β ln q = lnC;
mαqβ = C;
u(m, q) = f(mαqβ);
f(t) = f(tαtβ) = tf(1);
f(1) =
u0
mα0 q
β
0
=
pβ0
ααββ
;
u(m, q) =
pβ0
ααββ
·mαqβ.
Further, we use the indifference curve mαqβ = mα
0
qβ
0
with qs = q0 − q and qd = q − q0 in
order to obtain the supply and demand curves due to weighted rebalancing:
ps =
p0q
1/α
0
(q0 − qs)1/α ; pd =
p0q
1/α
0
(q0 + qd)1/α
;
qs < q0;
∫
∞
0
pd dqd =
α
β
· p0q0 = m0;
dps
dqs
=
p0
αq0
at qs = 0;
dpd
dqd
= − p0
αq0
at qd = 0.
For a finite change in price from p0 to p1, we have the ratio between u1 and u0 equal
to the weighted arithmetic mean of the prices divided by their weighted geometric mean:
u1
u0
=
αp0 + βp1
pα0p
β
1
⇒ %∆u = αβ
2
· (%∆p)2 +O ((%∆p)3) at %∆p = 0.
Let us notice that the case of α = β = 1/2 is special in the following two aspects. First,
it is the only proportion in which u1/u0 ratio is invariant to the direction of change in
price, the latter being crucial for unpredictable markets. Second, α = β = 1/2 maximizes
%∆u for small changes in prices which can be very useful for liquidity providers.
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